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COMMENT
GOPHER TO MARTINEZ: A JOURNEY ACROSS
THE SHIFTING SANDS OF PARTICULARIZED
SUSPICION IN MONTANA
J. Wayne Capp1
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution's Framers could never have envisioned a
single sentence produced by their endeavors and designed to
1. J.D. Candidate, University of Montana School of Law, May 2005. This
comment would not have been possible without the assistance and support of my
Montana Law Review colleagues. Special acknowledgment must go out to Jim Johnson,
who challenged me to exert the time and effort to attempt this treatment of
particularized suspicion in Montana jurisprudence. A debt of gratitude must also go out
to Tom Korver, whose friendship, technical insights, and editing skills assisted me in
polishing this work into what appears now for the reader. Professor Andrew King-Ries
has served many roles in the development of this work and my scholarly aptitudes - from
professor to mentor and now good friend - I am both honored and humbled by his
confidence in me. Finally, my deepest appreciation and love must go out to my wife,
Carol Bruski-Capp, who has provided me with a lifetime of inspiration and support that
makes all my accomplishments possible.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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protect American citizens from unreasonable intrusions by the
government would today have so great an impact on our modern
mobile culture. 3 Literally every citizen who is licensed to drive a
motor vehicle 4 is likely to encounter a time when his Fourth
Amendment rights will be tested in an encounter with a police
officer stopping them as they go about their daily lives. The vast
majority of these encounters will end with a short detention, a
traffic ticket, or a warning to drive more carefully. But others
will result in searches of the vehicle, searches of the persons
within, physical arrests of the occupants, trials, and prison
sentences. Whatever the reason or result of these brief (and
sometimes not so brief) encounters between citizens and the
police, the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
search and seizure are implicated.5 And perhaps no other
police-initiated stop of a citizen has received more scrutiny by
the courts than those that have been based, not on the direct
observations and knowledge of the officer, but instead upon
information received from third parties who might collectively
be termed "citizen informants. '6  One scholar succinctly
characterized the Fourth Amendment tensions inherent in this
3. Although the Fourth Amendment "may appear clear and concise, [this] single
sentence has generated countless volumes of text." Elizabeth Ahern Wells, Warrantless
Traffic Stops: A Suspension of Constitutional Guarantees in Post September 11th
America, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 899, 900 (2003). One scholar has even observed that, "[tihe
fourth amendment is the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and
obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that every effort to extract
themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck." Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of
the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985).
4. In 2002 (the most recent year statistics are available) the number of licensed
drivers in the U.S. was estimated to be 194,295,633. Infoplease, Age and Gender
Distribution of U.S. Drivers, 2002, available at
http://www.infoplease.comlipaA0908123.html (last visited November 5, 2004). In 2002
it was estimated 230,000,000 motor vehicles were registered in the U.S. Infoplease,
Licensed Drivers and Vehicle Registrations, available at
http://www.infoplease.com/ipaIA0908125.html (last visited November 5, 2004).
5. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). "It is quite plain that the Fourth
Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the
station house and prosecution for crime .... It must be recognized that whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person." Id. at 16.
6. The term "citizen informant" as used here is intended to be the broadest
possible characterization and would include citizens who report suspicious or criminal
activities via telephone reports to police dispatch facilities (911 callers, both identified
and anonymous); citizens who directly report their observations to police (identified and
unidentified citizen walk-up reports); and the more nefarious "confidential informants"
(often members of the criminal underworld who provide information to police in
exchange for money, criminal charge reductions, or even revenge) who wish to protect
their identities as informants for reasons of personal safety or embarrassment.
206 Vol. 66
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aspect of police practices when he wrote:
[P]olice are often faced with conflicting priorities. On one hand,
police are forced to rely on incomplete, inaccurate, unverified, or
contradictory information. On the other hand, police feel a good
faith sense of urgency to act... [t]his uncertainty in the validity of
information presents the difficult situation for police of knowing
how to proceed without running afoul of individual Fourth
Amendment rights. The difficult issue for the courts to decide in
assessing police action in this area is how to balance the
legitimate needs of law enforcement in protecting the public, while
effectively protecting individual Fourth Amendment rights.
7
On April 1, 2003 the Montana Supreme Court decided State
v. Martinezs which significantly constricted the ability of
Montana law enforcement officers to use information obtained
from citizen informants to support investigative traffic stops of
criminal suspects. The Montana court denied that it had
changed previously articulated standards of particularized
suspicion necessary for an officer to conduct a constitutionally
acceptable investigative stop.9 But the dissenting opinion of
Justice Jim Rice sternly warns that the Martinez decision
confused the standards of particularized suspicion with those of
probable cause and, in doing so, may have impacted broader
public safety concerns. 10
This comment will use State v. Martinez as a backdrop to
trace the history of particularized suspicion in Montana and
examine the Montana Supreme Court's recent and controversial
departure from established precedent regarding the necessary
prerequisites for law enforcement investigative stops in
Montana. Part II will trace the development of Montana's
particularized suspicion standards for law enforcement
investigative stops by discussing prominent federal cases
influencing Montana jurisprudence, as well as Montana cases
7. Jason Kyle Bryk, Anonymous Tips to Law Enforcement and the Fourth
Amendment: Arguments for Adopting An Imminent Danger Exception and Retaining the
Totality of the Circumstances Test, 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 277, 279 (2003).
8. 2003 MT 65, 314 Mont. 434, 67 P.3d 207.
9. Id. 7170.
10. Justice Rice wrote:
It cannot be overemphasized that this is a case involving particularized
suspicion, and not probable cause .... The Court has abandoned the totality of
the circumstances test for a narrow and rigid application of standards which
bears no resemblance to practical reality . . . this decision will eventually
penalize all citizens by diminishing the [peace] officers' ability to protect their
public safety.
Id. 7 77, 94 (Rice, J., dissenting). A separate dissenting opinion was written by Justice
Patricia 0. Cotter. Id. 11 96-97 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
2072005
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leading up to Martinez. Part III will describe the relevant facts
of Martinez, the court's holdings, and the dissenting opinions in
the case. Part IV will critically analyze Martinez in the context
of previous Montana Supreme Court decisions and suggest a
trend within the court, which has resulted in an inconsistent
treatment of particularized suspicion standards that conflicts
with earlier precedents. Indeed, the court now seems to have
adopted, at least in some cases, a standard for investigative
stops more akin to probable cause than particularized suspicion.
The analysis will further assert that the Montana Supreme
Court has created confusion and a nebulous standard for
Montana law enforcement officers to follow when determining
whether an investigative stop of a criminal suspect will meet
Montana constitutional standards, especially when
particularized suspicion has origins in information received from
a confidential informants. Part V will conclude by summarizing
the impact of Martinez and suggest that the court should return
to the more predictable particularized suspicion standard
originally adopted by the court and codified by the Montana
Legislature.
II. THE ORIGINS OF PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION
A. Federal Jurisprudence
1. The Terry Stop.
A discussion of investigative stops by law enforcement
officers must always begin with the fundamental protections
against unreasonable search and seizure as specified in the U.S.
Constitution.11 Because Fourth Amendment issues are always
prevalent in such stops, the law of Montana relating to
investigative stops has often been affected by federal court
decisions.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable search and
seizure extend to citizens wherever an individual may harbor a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 12  In Terry v. Ohio, the
Supreme Court specifically held that the citizen on the street
enjoys the same Fourth Amendment protections afforded a
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
Vol. 66208
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citizen in his home.13 The Court held that whenever a police
officer approaches an individual and restrains his freedom to
leave, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs. 14
But the Court in Terry also recognized the need to balance
the inherent tensions between Fourth Amendment protections of
the citizen on the street and the power of the police to stop and
question "suspicious persons" who might be engaged in criminal
behaviors. 5 In balancing the citizen's right to be free from
unreasonable seizures against the police power to intrude upon
the constitutionally protected interest when dealing with
suspicious circumstances, the Court held that a police officer
must justify the intrusion by pointing to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.' 6
2. The Police Informant.
Terry provided a standard for when a police officer's direct
observations might provide a basis for a reasonable intrusion
upon a citizen's Fourth Amendment protections. 17 But the issue
of when third party information might provide a similar basis
was not addressed until 1972 when the Supreme Court
considered Adams v. Williams.'8
In Adams, a police officer approached a man sitting in a
parked car in a high-crime neighborhood after receiving
information from an informant who reported the man possessed
illegal narcotics and was armed with a handgun.' 9 When the.
officer approached the man and tapped on the window the man
rolled down the widow and the officer reached into the car and
retrieved a handgun from the suspect's waistband. 20 Although
the gun had not been visible from the officers perspective, it was
located exactly where the informant had said it would be.21 The
man was arrested for unlawful possession of the pistol and a
subsequent search yielded substantial quantities of heroin, both
13. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. at 10.
16. Id. at 21.
17. Id.
18. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
19. Id. at 144-45.
20. Id. at 145.
21. Id.
2005 209
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on the suspect's person and within his vehicle. 22
The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's convictions
based on the evidence seized during the encounter and placed
significance on the fact that the informant was previously
known to the officer and had provided reliable information to the
officer in the past. 23 Noteworthy in the Court's analysis was the
fact that the informant could have been subjected to arrest and
prosecution under State law if the information had not been
correct.24  In deciding Adams the Court extended Terry to
circumstances where information was received from third
parties and rejected the argument that reasonable cause for a
stop by a police officer can only be based on the officer's personal
observations.25
The issue of tips from anonymous sources was taken up by
the Supreme Court in 1990 in Alabama v. White.26  White
involved a detailed call to police that indicated a person would
be leaving a specific apartment at a particular time, driving a
particular vehicle, and traveling to a particular motel while
possessing a brown attache containing cocaine.2 7 Police went to
the apartment building and observed White leaving at the
indicated time in the described vehicle. 28 Police followed the
vehicle to the motel described by the anonymous informant,
where officers initiated an investigative stop. 29 Officers then
advised White that she was under investigation for possession of
narcotics and asked for consent to search the vehicle. 30 White
consented and officers located a brown attache case, which
White agreed to open.31 The attache case contained marijuana
and the officers arrested White, subsequently finding cocaine in
her purse. 32 White appealed her conviction on drug charges,
asserting that police had no reasonable suspicion prior to
stopping her vehicle. 33
22. Id.
23. Id. at 146.
24. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47.
25. Id. at 147-48.
26. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
27. Id. at 327.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. White, 496 U.S. at 327
33. Id. at 328.
6
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The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the anonymous
tip had been sufficiently detailed so as to allow the officers to
adequately corroborate the informant's information through
observation of White's activities. 34  Therefore, the officers'
investigative stop of White's vehicle was within the reasonable
suspicion standards of Terry and consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. 35
In deciding White, the Court articulated that reasonable
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, so
the standard of reasonable suspicion can be established with
information of a different quantity or content than that required
for probable cause. 36 Furthermore, the White Court opined that
reasonable suspicion may arise from information "less reliable
than that required to show probable cause."37
3. Particularized Suspicion and the Totality of the
Circumstances.
In 1981 the Supreme Court established the principle of
"particularized suspicion" of criminal activity in United States v.
Cortez.38 In Cortez, U.S. Border Patrol agents had discovered a
well-used trail leading from the Mexican border to a nearby
highway.3 9 The investigating agents had deduced a likely
suspect vehicle profile based on the evidence presented by the
frequent use of the trail, the general direction of travel toward
the highway, the number of persons using the trail, and the days
and times the trail was used.40 On a night when the agents
believed it likely that a smuggling operation would occur, the
officers stationed themselves along the highway with the
intention of stopping any vehicle that exhibited the profile their
deductions had revealed. 41 When the agents observed a vehicle
matching the profile, an investigative stop was initiated.42 The
vehicle carried six illegal aliens, as well as the smuggler, who
was charged and convicted.43 On appeal, the defendant argued
34. Id. at 331.
35. Id. at 332.
36. Id. at 330.
37. Id.
38. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
39. Id. at 413.
40. Id. at 413-14.
41. Id. at 414-15.
42. Id. at 415.
43. Id. at 416.
2005
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that the agents lacked a sufficient basis to stop the vehicle.44
In upholding the investigative stop as lawful, the Cortez
Court articulated a two-pronged test for the development of
particularized suspicion necessary to justify an investigative
stop.45 First, the process must be based upon all surrounding
circumstances and, second, the process must raise a suspicion
that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in
wrongdoing. 46
4. Pretext Investigative Stops.
The tension between the competing interests of Fourth
Amendment protections and law enforcement stops discussed in
Terry was refined in 1996 when the Supreme Court took up
Whren v. United States.47 The case addressed the issue of so-
called "pretext" vehicle stops for minor traffic infractions
affording police the opportunity to uncover other criminal
activities. 48
In Whren, plainclothes police officers in an unmarked car
observed a vehicle that, in their view, remained parked at an
intersection for an unusually long period of time. 49 The vehicle
abruptly turned right without signaling and accelerated away at
what the officers characterized as an "unreasonable" speed.50
The officers followed the vehicle to another red light where it
again stopped.51 One of the officers then approached the vehicle
and identified himself as a police officer. 52 When the officer
drew up to the driver's window, he observed two large plastic
bags in Whren's hands, which he believed contained crack
cocaine. 53 Whren was arrested and convicted on various federal
drug offenses.54
Whren appealed his criminal convictions arguing that the
highly regulated use of automobiles through traffic and safety
rules allows police the ability to stop any given motorist for a
44. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 416.
45. Id. at 418.
46. Id.
47. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
48. Id. at 809.
49. Id. at 808.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Wren, 517 U.S. at 808-09.
54. Id. at 809.
8
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technical violation at any given time. 55 Whren further argued
that this creates the temptation for police to use minor
violations as a means to stop motorists based on factors
unrelated to either particularized suspicion or probable cause. 56
The Court affirmed Whren's convictions and held that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on
the subjective motivations of the individual officer making the
stop.57 Indeed, the Court stated: "[T]he Fourth Amendment's
concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken
in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent. s58 The
Court concluded:
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at
what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly
violated that infraction itself can no' longer be the ordinary
measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could
identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard
(or what right) we would decide, as petitioners would have us do,
what particular provisions are sufficiently important to merit
enforcement. 59
On the basis of Terry, Cortez, and Whren, the U.S. Supreme
Court clearly established that law enforcement investigative
stops comply with Fourth Amendment protections if police can
articulate objective circumstances that demonstrate a
reasonable particularized suspicion of wrongdoing by a
particular individual. Furthermore, the holdings of Adams and
White established that investigative stops comply with
constitutional protections even when particularized suspicion
originated via information provided by informants. These cases
set the stage for the Montana Supreme Court to apply the
principle of particularized suspicion to Montana cases.
B. Montana Jurisprudence
1. Terry Stops, Particularized Suspicion, and the Totality of the
Circumstances.
The Montana Constitution provides protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures with language very similar
55. Id. at 810.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 813.
58. Id. at 814.
59. Wren, 517 U.S. at 818-819.
2005 213
9
Capp: A Journey Across the Shifting Sands of Particularized Suspicion in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2005
214 MONTANA LAW RE VIEW Vol. 66
to the U.S. Constitution. 60 Prior to 1981 the standard for an
investigative stop in Montana was predicated on probable cause
rather than particularized suspicion.61 But in 1981 the Montana
Supreme Court decided State v. Gopher,62 which specifically
adopted the particularized suspicion standards for investigative
stops outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cortez. In Gopher,
a police officer had responded to an early morning silent alarm
at a pawn shop where he found a broken window.63 During his
investigation at the scene, the officer observed a vehicle drive
past the business at a slow rate of speed while the occupants
exhibited an unusual interest in the crime scene. 64 Based on his
experience, the officer knew that burglars commonly break into
structures and then retreat to see if a police response is
triggered. 65 The officer alerted other officers in the area and
advised that the vehicle should be stopped.66 Upon stopping the
vehicle, officers located merchandise stolen from the pawn shop,
and the occupants were arrested and Gopher was convicted. 67
Gopher appealed his conviction arguing that the police had
lacked probable cause in stopping the vehicle. 6 The Montana
Supreme Court agreed that the responding officers lacked
sufficient facts to demonstrate probable cause before making the
investigative stop. 69 But the court then cited the Terry ruling
establishing the constitutionality of an investigative stop in the
absence of probable cause, as well as the decision in Cortez a few
60. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or
the person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation reduced to writing.
Although this language is similar to the U.S. Constitution, the Montana Constitution
also contains an express right to privacy, which is often cited by the Montana Supreme
Court when extending to Montana citizens a greater level of individual protection than
would be afforded to similar circumstances in federal courts. See MONT. CONST. art. I, §
10.
61. See State v. Rader, 177 Mont. 252, 581 P.2d 437 (1978); see also State v. Lahr,
172 Mont. 32, 560 P.2d 527 (1977).
62. 193 Mont. 189, 631 P.2d 293 (1981).
63. Id., 193 Mont. at 190, 631 P.2d at 294.
64. Id., 193 Mont. at 190, 631 P.2d at 294.
65. Id., 193 Mont. at 190, 631 P.2d at 294.
66. Id., 193 Mont. at 190, 631 P.2d at 294.
67. Id., 193 Mont. at 190-91, 631 P.2d at 294.
68. Gopher, 193 Mont. at 191, 631 P.2d at 294.
69. Id., 193 Mont. at 191, 631 P.2d at 294-95.
10
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months earlier.70 The Montana court then adopted the Cortez
rules and held that an investigative stop of a vehicle was
justified when a police officer could articulate two conditions:
First, objective data from which an experienced officer can make
certain inferences; and, second, a resulting suspicion that the
occupant of a certain vehicle is or has been engaged in
wrongdoing or was a witness to criminal activity.71 The court
further held that when a trained police officer has a
particularized suspicion that the occupant of a vehicle is or has
been engaged in criminal activity, or witness thereto, a limited
and reasonable investigatory stop and search is justified. 72 The
Gopher holding was significant in yet another respect-it
provided the basis for a 1991 amendment to Montana's
investigative stop statute.73
The Montana Supreme Court further extended the concept
of particularized suspicion in 1982 when the court decided State
v. Morsette.74 In Morsette, the court held that particularized
suspicion need not require an officer's certainty that a particular
vehicle was involved in a criminal activity, but instead requires
only a reasonable suspicion based on his training and
experience, coupled with the factual circumstances of the
situation.7 5
A divergence between Montana and federal jurisprudence
came nearly a year before the Whren decision, when the
Montana Supreme Court decided State v. Reynolds.7 6 On facts
very similar to those in Whren, the Montana court reached the
opposite conclusion of the U.S. Supreme Court when it
determined that an officer's observation of a vehicle traveling at
an unreasonable speed and then stopping at a stop sign for an
extended period of time was insufficient to create a
particularized suspicion to justify an investigative stop.77
70. Id., 193 Mont. at 192, 631 P.2d at 295.
71. Id., 193 Mont. at 194, 631 P.2d at 296.
72. Id., 193 Mont. at 194, 631 P.2d at 296.
73. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (1991) stated:
In order to obtain or verify an account of the person's presence or conduct or to
determine whether to arrest the person, a peace office may stop any person or
vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion
that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense.
74. 201 Mont. 233, 654 P.2d 503 (1982).
75. Id., 201 Mont. at 241, 654 P.2d at 507.
76. 272 Mont. 46, 899 P.2d 540 (1995).
77. Id., 272 Mont. at 51, 899 P.2d at 543.
2005 215
11
Capp: A Journey Across the Shifting Sands of Particularized Suspicion in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2005
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
In 1998, the Montana Supreme Court decided State v.
Henderson.78 In Henderson the court examined a traffic stop
initiated by an officer after he noticed a vehicle that exhibited no
front or rear license plate and, due to darkly tinted rear
windows on the vehicle, he was unable to see if a temporary
registration was displayed. 79 After stopping the vehicle, the
officer approached the driver to identify himself and inform the
driver of the nature of the stop.80 During contact with the
driver, the officer noticed the odor of alcoholic beverages and
other signs indicating the driver might be intoxicated.81 After
several field sobriety tests indicated the driver was indeed
intoxicated, the officer placed him under arrest.8 2 A search
incidental to the arrest also revealed the driver to be in
possession of illegal narcotics.8 3 After completing the arrest, the
officer inspected a temporary registration sticker that had been
obscured by the dark rear window of the vehicle and found that
there was actually no registration violation.8 4 The district court
granted a defense motion to suppress all evidence obtained
during the stop, reasoning that the officer lacked sufficient
particularized suspicion to stop Henderson and the State
appealed.8 5
In reversing the trial court decision, the Montana Supreme
Court mirrored the standards of Whren and held that the
officer's inability to plainly view the temporary sticker was
sufficient to give rise to a particularized suspicion that the
vehicle was operating in violation of a state statute requiring
proper registration.8 6 Most importantly for this discussion, the
court relied on its prior decisions in Gopher (particularized
suspicion standards) and Morsette (an officer need not be certain
an offense has been committed) to support its decision.8 7
78. 1998 MT 233, 291 Mont. 77, 966 P.2d 137.
79. Id. 1 4.
80. Id. T 7.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Henderson, 8.
85. Id. 1.
86. Id. 14. "A person may not operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways
of Montana unless the vehicle is properly registered and has the proper number plates
conspicuously displayed, one on the front and one on the rear of the vehicle, each
securely fastened to prevent it from swinging and unobstructed from plain view." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 61-3-301(1) (2003).
87. Henderson, 1 12.
216 Vol. 66
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2. The Police Informant.
Although Gopher and Morsette merged Montana
investigative stop criteria with the federal criteria outlined in
Cortez, the Montana Supreme Court soon began to exercise its
propensity to "refuse to 'march lock-step' with the United States
Supreme Court where Constitutional issues are concerned.
88
One point of controversy in the Montana jurisprudence of
particularized suspicion was highlighted by State v. Anderson.8 9
Anderson presented the Montana court with the issue of
whether sufficient particularized suspicion could exist when a
motor vehicle stop was based solely on an informant's tip and
police had not corroborated the tip through independent
investigation. 90
In Anderson, a narcotics detective had received an
informant's tip indicating Anderson would be traveling from
Washington to Montana in a specifically described vehicle that
would contain a large quantity of marijuana. 91 Acting on the
informant's tip, officers were positioned along the indicated
route of travel and observed Anderson's vehicle crossing the
Montana border from Idaho.92  Although Anderson had
committed no traffic infractions or other observable violations of
law, the officers stopped the vehicle and conducted a search of
the vehicle and the occupants. 93 A quantity of marijuana was
found within the vehicle and Anderson was arrested and
convicted.94
In reversing Anderson's conviction, the Montana Supreme
Court noted that the officers involved in the investigation had
not corroborated the informant's tip with independent
88. See State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (Fifth Amendment
protections); State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61 (1995) (Fourth Amendment
protections); see also State v. Lamere, 226 Mont. 323, 735 P.2d 511 (1987) (Fourth
Amendment protections in inventory searches prior to incarceration). Refusing to
"march lock-step" with pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court has become a mantra
whenever the Montana court has extended individual protections to Montana citizens
beyond those provided by the U.S. Constitution. The Montana court has used this
language no less than 26 times since 1983. Ironically, the phrase made its first
appearance in a dissent from the majority, which had upheld federal interpretation of
the Fifth Amendment in a state criminal prosecution. See State v. Jackson, 206 Mont.
338, 355, 672 P.2d 255, 263 (1983) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
89. 258 Mont. 510, 853 P.2d 1245 (1993).
90. Id., 258 Mont. at 513, 853 P.2d at 1247.
91. Id., 258 Mont. at 511, 853 P.2d at 1246.
92. Id., 258 Mont. at 511-12, 853 P.2d at 1246.
93. Id., 258 Mont. at 512-13, 853 P.2d at 1246-47.
94. Id., 258 Mont. at 512-13, 853 P.2d at 1247.
2005
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investigation or observations that suggested illegal activity.95 In
dicta that would later become crucial to the Martinez decision,
the Montana court stated:
A tip that has not been shown to be reliable or trustworthy for
purposes of establishing probable cause to procure a search
warrant is also unreliable for purposes of providing an officer with
a particularized suspicion. An uncorroborated, unreliable tip is
not objective data as contemplated by Cortez and Gopher.96
In 1997, the Montana Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Pratt97 refined the issue of informant tips as a basis for
particularized suspicion as it considered whether police could
stop a vehicle solely on information relayed from a citizen via an
emergency 911 dispatcher.98  In Pratt, a convenience store
attendant had called police to report a possible drunk driver he
had observed leaving the store.99 The citizen provided his name,
location, and a detailed description of the vehicle and driver,
including the vehicle license plate and direction of travel. 100
Based only on this information an officer on patrol spotted
defendant's vehicle and stopped him.101
In deciding whether sufficient particularized suspicion
warranted the stop of Pratt's vehicle, the Montana court adopted
a three-factor test to assess the reliability of an informant
providing information to the police: First, whether the citizen
informant identifies himself to law enforcement and thus
exposes himself to criminal and civil liability if the report is
false; second, whether the information is based on the personal
knowledge of the informant, and; third, whether the officer's
own observations corroborate the informant's information. 10 2
The court determined that the first two factors were readily
apparent from the facts of the case: The citizen had identified
himself to the 911 dispatcher, told police where he could be
contacted for additional information, and the reported
circumstances were based on the informant's first-hand
observations at the convenience store. 103 As to the third factor,
the court reasoned that the informant's report was sufficiently
95. Anderson, 258 Mont. at 515-16, 853 P.2d at 1249.
96. Id., 258 Mont. at 515-16, 853 P.2d at 1249.
97. 286 Mont. 156, 951 P.2d 37 (1997).
98. Id., 286 Mont. at 161-62, 951 P.2d at 40-41.
99. Id., 286 Mont. at 159, 951 P.2d at 39.
100. Id., 286 Mont. at 159, 951 P.2d at 39.
101. Id., 286 Mont. at 159, 951 P.2d at 39.
102. Id., 286 Mont. at 165, 951 P.2d at 42-43.
103. Pratt, 286 Mont. at 165-66, 951 P.2d at 43.
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corroborated by the officer's observation of defendant's vehicle
bearing the described license plate "within a short period of
time, traveling in the direction and on the same street indicated
by [the informant]." 104 The court further stated:
[T]he issue of whether or not a particularized suspicion exists is
factually driven and depends on the totality of the circumstances.
Information from a tip provided by a citizen informant, whether
identified or anonymous, may provide the basis for an
investigatory stop. The tip must be analyzed under the three
factors that we adopt . . .to determine its reliability. Generally,
tips that are less reliable, such as those provided by anonymous
informants, necessarily require more corroborations on the part of
the investigating officer in order to establish a particularized
suspicion. 105
The Pratt test was again applied in the context of the citizen
informant providing information to sustain particularized
suspicion in State v. Elison.10 6 In this case, the informant was a
citizen participating in a citizen ride-along program with a
police officer when he observed the driver of a vehicle smoking
from a brass-colored pipe.10 7 The citizen observed that the
driver, Elison, appeared startled when he noticed the police
vehicle nearby and he lowered the pipe out of view.108 The
citizen informed the officer of what he had seen and the officer
maneuvered his squad car to allow the other vehicle to pass by,
but Elison refused to pass until the officer came to a complete
stop.109 The officer then stopped Elison's vehicle and ultimately
discovered the defendant to be in possession of narcotics. 110
In applying the Pratt tests to Elison, the Montana court
found the first factor of identity of the informant was
established by the simple fact that the informant was seated
next to the officer in the police vehicle."' The court also found
the second factor satisfied when the informant conveyed his first
104. Id., 286 Mont. at 166, 951 P.2d at 43.
105. Id., 286 Mont. at 168, 951 P.2d at 44.
106. 2000 MT 288, 302 Mont. 228, 14 P.3d 456. Elison was not the first case
following Pratt to enunciate the informant reliability factors outlined by Pratt. See, e.g.,
State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, 17, 293 Mont. 476, 17, 977 P.2d 974, 17. Perhaps
more noteworthy is the observation that the court does not always turn to the Pratt tests
when informant information is the initial basis for law enforcement action when
initiating investigative stops of motor vehicles. See infra text accompanying discussion
of Grindeland v. State, notes 124, 136.
107. Elison, 6.
108. Id.
109. Id. 7.
110. Id. 8-10.
111. Id. 1 17.
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hand observations to the officer, even though the officer had no
basis for determining whether the informant's basis for
believing the brass-colored pipe was evidence of marijuana
possession. 112 As to the final Pratt factor, the court stated that it
had never "required that an officer personally observe illegal
activity in order to have a particularized suspicion justifying a
traffic stop."113  The court upheld particularized suspicion for
Elison's stop and further stated:
[W]here an informant's tip is anonymous and lacks any indication
of the basis for the informant's opinion, the officer must
corroborate the tip by observing suspicious behavior that alerts
the officer to the existence of a possible violation .... However, a
particularized suspicion does not require certainty on the part of
the law enforcement officer. Where a tip is more reliable, such as
those circumstances where the informant's identity is known and
the informant reports his or her personal observations which led
the informant to believe that criminal conduct had occurred,
corroboration of innocent behavior by law enforcement may be
sufficient to raise a particularized suspicion. 114
3. Pretext Investigative Stops.
In 2000, the Montana Supreme Court specifically cited
Whren when it decided the issue of so-called "pretext"
investigative stops in State v. Farabee.1 5 In Farabee, narcotics
agents were conducting daytime surveillance of a residence
believed to be a location for drug trafficking.1 16 The agents
observed Farabee leaving the residence after they believed it
likely that an illegal drug transaction had occurred.11 7 As
Farabee drove away from the residence, the agents noticed that
one headlight of the vehicle had sustained damage and might
not be operable.118 The agents requested the assistance of a
uniformed officer to stop Farabee for a potential headlight
violation.11 9 The vehicle was stopped and the narcotics agents
approached Farabee to question him about his activities at the
residence he'd recently visited.120 Ultimately, the agents
112. Id. T 19.
113. Elison, 1 20.
114. Id. (citations omitted).
115. 2000 MT 265, 31, 302 Mont. 29, 31, 22 P.3d 175, 31 (citation omitted).
116. Id. 5.
117. Id. 6.
118. Id.
119. Id. T 7.
120. Id. T 8.
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obtained consent to search the vehicle and discovered illegal
drugs and drug paraphernalia, for which Farabee was arrested
and convicted. 121
Farabee moved to suppress the evidence seized during the
investigative stop and argued that the officers' observations in
broad daylight could not have allowed them to form the requisite
particularized suspicion of a headlight violation.122  The
Montana Supreme Court rejected Farabee's argument and,
citing Gopher, held that the lawfulness of a traffic stop under
the Montana Constitution depends only on whether the officer
had a particularized suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle
has committed or is committing an offense. 123
4. A Return to Probable Cause?
Less than a year after deciding Farabee, the Montana court
offered the first hint that the particularized suspicion standards
of Gopher might be crumbling when the court took up
Grindeland v. State.124 The case involved an appeal related to a
petition for reinstatement of Grindeland's driver's license, which
was suspended after he refused to submit to a breath test when
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. 125 The
district court ruled that the initial investigative stop was not
supported by particularized suspicion and granted Grindeland's
petition for reinstatement of his driver's license, which the State
appealed. 126
In Grindeland, a deputy sheriff had responded to an
anonymous citizen complaint regarding a careless driver. 27
Upon arrival in the vicinity specified by the complaint, the
deputy located a vehicle matching the description given by the
anonymous citizen and observed the vehicle leaving a restaurant
parking lot. 128 After following the vehicle, the deputy observed
the driver make a right-hand turn without signaling. 129 Based
on the observed traffic violation, the deputy initiated an
investigative stop, which culminated in Grindeland's arrest
121. Farabee, 8.
122. Id. 13.
123. Id. 30.
124, 2001 MT 196, 306 Mont. 262, 32 P.3d 767.
125. Id. 5.
126. Id.
127. Id. 3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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when the deputy determined he was driving under the influence
of alcohol. 130
The trial court concluded the deputy lacked sufficient
particularized suspicion of the traffic violation because a signal
was required only when other traffic might be affected by the
turn. 131 The language of the statute requiring a turn signal
stated: "No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an
appropriate signal .. . in the event any other traffic may be
affected by such movement.1132
The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's
interpretation of the statute.133  Although the court
acknowledged the deputy's testimony that other vehicles were in
the vicinity of Grindeland's car when the un-signaled turn was
made, the court noted the deputy could not recall the exact
location of the other vehicles in relation to Grindeland. 134 The
court held that the deputy, absent knowledge of the location of
other vehicles in the vicinity, could not have reasonably
determined that a violation of the traffic statute had occurred.135
Therefore, the court concluded, the deputy did not have
sufficient particularized suspicion to justify the investigative
stop and the district court decision was affirmed. 136 Grindeland
is significant in Montana's particularized suspicion
jurisprudence because the Montana court seemed to be saying
130. Grindeland, It 4.
131. Id. 9.
132. Id. 11.
No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the
manner hereinafter provided in the event any other traffic may be affected by
such movement .... A signal of intention to turn right or left, other than when
passing, when required shall be given continuously during not less than the
last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning in any business, residence,
or urban district ....
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-336(1)-(2) (2001).
133. Grindeland, 11.
134. Id. 13.
135. Id.
136. Id. I 14. It is illuminating to consider whether the result of Grindeland would
have been the same if the 'court had applied the Pratt test in its analysis. In other
words, applying the Pratt test might have instead focused the court on whether the
officer's observations of a careless driving maneuver by Grindeland sufficiently verified
the anonymous citizen's information so as to support the officer's particularized
suspicion that Grindeland was indeed "driving carelessly", thus validating the
investigative stop. The key question, however, remains unanswered: Why wasn't Pratt
applied to the circumstances of Grindeland when the issue of an anonymous citizen
informant was critical to the officer's initial observations prior to making the
investigative stop?
Vol. 66222
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through Grindeland that a law enforcement officer must be able
to reasonably prove an underlying offense before initiating an
investigative stop. 137
If a new standard for particularized suspicion in Montana
was indeed being established in Grindeland, the Montana
Supreme Court decision in Kleinsasser v. State138 seemed to
articulate the new standard even more forcefully.
Kleinsasser involved an officer on patrol at night who
observed a man urinating alongside a vehicle parked adjacent to
a public highway. 139 The officer passed by the vehicle, but then
returned to warn the man to find a more discrete location to
relieve himself so as to avoid a potential disorderly conduct
violation.1 40 After returning to the parked vehicle the officer
spoke with Kleinsasser, who was behind the wheel of the car.' 41
The officer smelled the odor of alcoholic beverages and, after
subjecting Kleinsasser to several sobriety tests, placed him
under arrest for driving under the influence of alcoholic
beverages. 42 Kleinsasser refused to provide a breath sample
and his driver's license was seized and suspended. 143
Kleinsasser appealed the suspension of his driver's license,
arguing that the officer lacked sufficient particularized suspicion
when he returned to investigate the circumstances of a man
urinating along a public highway at night.144 The State argued
that the officer's stop was justified since the officer had
developed particularized suspicion that an individual in the car
had committed the crime of disorderly conduct. 145
137. For another example of this line of reasoning see State v. Lacasella, 2002 MT
326, 313 Mont. 185, 60 P.3d 975 (no particularized suspicion in the stop of a motor
vehicle when an officer, at night, failed to see a front license plate on a vehicle as it
passed him and the license plate was taped to the front passenger window of the
vehicle). But see State v. Henderson, 1998 MT 233, 291 Mont. 77, 966 P.2d 137 (officer's
inability to see temporary registration in tinted window sufficient to support
particularized suspicion for investigative stop).
138. 2002 MT 36, 308 Mont. 325, 42 P.3d 801.
139. Id. 3.
140. Id. Jil 4, 15. "A person commits the offense of disorderly conduct if he
knowingly disturbs the peace by: . . . creating a hazardous or physically offensive
condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose; .... MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-
101(1)(i) (2001).
141. Kleinsasser, 5.
142. Id. 6.
143. Id.
144. Id. 7 14.
145. Id. 7 15.
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In reversing the suspension of Kleinsasser's driver's license,
the Montana Supreme Court held that, although the act of
urinating on the roadway might be physically offensive to many,
the location of such an act would play a large part in
determining whether the act was illegal.146 Under the
circumstances of the case (a dark and isolated stretch of
roadway), the court reasoned that a violation of the disorderly
conduct statute could not have been sustained. 147 Therefore, the
court concluded that the investigative stop was not justified by a
particularized suspicion of criminal conduct and the subsequent
seizure of Kleinsasser's driver's license was invalid.148 The
court's decision in Kleinsasser appeared to signal a return to a
previously rejected standard of probable cause that must be
articulated before a law enforcement officer can initiate an
investigative stop. 149
Although Kleinsasser certainly did not implicate the
particularized suspicion standard arising from information
obtained by police from citizen informants, the holding of the
case does illustrate a marked departure from the two-part
particularized suspicion standard of Gopher. This divergence is
best illustrated by the strong dissent of Chief Justice Karla Gray
who wrote:
Particularized suspicion does not turn on whether a charge is
subsequently filed or on whether the State could prove beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal trial that, given the time, place and
circumstances, the offense had been committed. Thus, the
questions on which the court focuses-whether an occupant of the
Kleinsasser vehicle actually created a physically offensive
condition that served no legitimate purpose - - have no place in our
consideration of the present case. 150
If a law enforcement officer must be able to prove that an offense
has been committed before making an investigative stop, the
applicable statute [Montana Code Annotated section 46-5-401] has
been judicially repealed and Gopher has been effectively
overruled. 151
146. Id. 1 18-19.
147. Kleinsasser, 7.21.
148. Id. 22
149. Id. 29 (Gray, G.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Gray further remarked that the
majority had turned particularized suspicion "on its head by requiring law enforcement
officers to know, both in fact and under the law, that an offense has been committed
prior to making an investigative stop." Id. 24 (Gray, C.J. dissenting) (emphasis on
original).
150. Id. 31 (Gray, C.J. dissenting).
151. Id. 32 (Gray, C.J. dissenting).
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The tension within the Montana Supreme Court evidenced
in Kleinsasser arises again in Martinez, although expressed by
different justices. A close examination of Martinez lends
credence to Chief Justice Gray's warnings in Kleinsasser (and
echoed by Justice Rice's dissent in Martinez) and indeed leads
one to the inescapable conclusion that particularized suspicion
standards in Montana are far from settled.
III. STATE V. MARTINEZ
A. Summary of Facts'52
On October 20, 1999, Detective Richard Hirschi of the
Yellowstone County Sheriffs Department received a telephone
call from a woman who wanted to report that fifty pounds of
marijuana was being brought into the Billings area from
Oregon.153 The woman was later identified as the girlfriend of
Dennis Olson, one of the defendants ultimately arrested and
convicted in the case. 154 The woman told Detective Hirschi that
a man she knew as "Ricky" was transporting the marijuana in a
tan Ford Thunderbird bearing a license number WFY768 and
that "Ricky" would be staying at the Townhouse Inn in
Billings. 155 The woman agreed to identify herself to Detective
Hirschi and he met with her later the same day to obtain
additional information. 15 6 Although the woman was known to
Detective Hirschi, she was treated as a confidential informant
for the purposes of the police investigation.157 The woman told
Detective Hirschi that she had been in trouble with the law in
the past; that she had been sent to prison; that Olson was aware
of numerous illegal activities; and that she was motivated by a
desire to do what she thought was right. 58
152. I ask the reader's forgiveness for a detailed recitation of the facts of Martinez.
As is often the case when courts decide issues of particularized suspicion, interpretation
of the facts leading up to the defendant's investigative detention become extremely
important to the opinion. Therefore, it seems necessary to provide the reader with
sufficient details to understand the court's rationale, as well as evaluate the merits of
my forthcoming analysis.
153. Br. of Resp't at 1-2, State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, 314 Mont. 434, 67 P.3d 207
(Nos. 00-781 & 00-802).
154. Br. of Resp't at 1, Martinez (Nos. 00-781 & 00-802).
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id.
157. Martinez, 1 3.
158. Id. 1 35.
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Detectives investigated the informant's tips and visited the
motel indicated to be the location where "Ricky" would be
staying. 159 Detectives learned that a person had registered at
the motel two weeks earlier driving a tan Ford Thunderbird
with license plate WFY768 and that motel receipts indicated the
man's name was Jesus Martinez. 160 The confidential informant
did not know anyone by the name of Jesus Martinez. 161 Motel
employees questioned by the police indicated no suspicious
activity had been noted during Martinez's stay, but agreed to
notify police if the Martinez returned in the future. 162
On November 2, 1999, motel employees notified police that
Martinez had again checked into the motel, this time driving a
different vehicle.1 63  Later the same day, the confidential
informant notified police that the man she knew as "Ricky" had
again checked into the motel.1 64 Additionally, the confidential
informant provided information regarding a vehicle that Daniel
Olson had stolen in Great Falls, which had then been driven to
Billings where it had been abandoned.1 65 Police subsequently
located the vehicle, verified it was stolen, and found it in the
location described by the confidential informant. 166 Police then
initiated a surveillance of Martinez and his activities over the
next two days, culminating in a traffic stop of Martinez's vehicle
when it was observed that he had made an allegedly illegal lane
change.1 67
During the traffic stop, police questioned Martinez and
obtained his consent to search the vehicle. 168 Assisted in the
search by a trained police canine, the officers located a small
quantity of marijuana (.4 grams), consisting of a single bud from
a plant. 169 Believing that they could not establish the marijuana
belonged to Martinez, police did not arrest Martinez or issue a
citation for the traffic violation. 170
159. Br. of Resp't at 2, Martinez (Nos. 00-781 & 00-802).
160. Appellant's Consolidated Br. at 3, State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, 314 Mont.
434, 67 P.3d 207 (Nos. 00-781 & 00-802).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 3-4.
163. Id. at 4.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Martinez, 5.
167. Id. 6-7.
168. Id. 7.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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On November 4, 1999, the confidential informant again
called police and advised that Martinez and Olson were leaving
Billings to travel to Bozeman where they intended to sell the
marijuana remaining in their possession. 171 The confidential
informant further advised that the men had been prompted to
change vehicles by the traffic stop of the previous day and she
described the vehicle the men would be driving to Bozeman. 172
An employee of the motel corroborated the confidential
informant's information by confirming the switch in vehicles and
providing a similar description of the vehicle to investigating
officers. 173  The motel employee further indicated that the
vehicle displayed a temporary registration sticker in the rear
window.174
Investigators acted on the information provided by the
confidential informant and the motel employee by establishing
surveillance along Interstate 90 between Billings and
Bozeman.' 75 Investigators determined that observation of the
described vehicle traveling beyond the City of Laurel would
sufficiently corroborate the information provided by the
confidential informant and the motel employee to provide a
basis to stop the vehicle and detain the occupants. 176 When
officers observed the described vehicle pass their surveillance
they stopped the vehicle for two reasons: First, the continuation
of the on-going narcotics investigation, and second, investigation
of the validity of the temporary registration displayed in the
rear window of the vehicle. 77
The investigating officers acknowledged that they were able
to identify the temporary registration soon after the vehicle had
been stopped, but only after the occupants had been asked to
exit the vehicle. 178 After asking Martinez and Olson to exit their
vehicle, investigators separated them, placed them in handcuffs,
advised them of their constitutional rights, 7 9 and questioned
them as to whether they were transporting narcotics. 80 Police
171. Br. of Resp't at 3, Martinez, (Nos. 00-781 & 00-802).
172. Id. at 3-4.
173. Id. at 4.
174. Martinez, T 8.
175. Br. of Resp't at 4, Martinez, (Nos. 00-781 & 00-802).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 4-5.
178. Id. at 5.
179. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
180. Martinez, T 10.
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used the same canine to sniff the vehicle and it again showed
signs positive for the presence of narcotics.' 8 ' Martinez refused
to consent to a search of the vehicle, but later confessed to
investigators that the vehicle contained a suitcase containing
"mota," which the officers interpreted to be marijuana.18 2
Martinez further advised the officers that he had traveled to
Billings on four previous occasions in which he had transported
between fifteen and twenty pounds of marijuana each time. 8 3
Based on this information, the vehicle was impounded, a search
warrant was obtained, and investigators seized approximately
fifteen pounds of marijuana from the vehicle. 8 4
At trial, Martinez and Olson filed separate motions to
suppress the evidence seized, arguing that the police lacked
sufficient particularized suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the
traffic stop yielding the narcotics. 8 5 Subsequently, the district
court denied the petitions and both Martinez and Olson later
pled guilty to felony narcotics charges, 8 6 while reserving their
right to appeal, which was then timely filed.18 7
B. Reasoning and Holding
1. The Court Questions the Authority of State v. Pratt for
Particularized Suspicion.
The sole issue on appeal was "whether the stop of the
vehicle driven by Martinez and Olson on November 4, 1999, was
supported by particularized suspicion.'' 88 Appellate briefs by
the State and the defendants relied on Pratt for legal arguments
pertaining to whether officers had sufficient particularized
suspicion to support the vehicle stop on Interstate 90 west of
181. Id.
182. Id. ITT 10-11.
183. Br. of Resp't at 5, Martinez, (Nos. 00-781 & 00-802).
184. Id.
185. Martinez, 12.
186. Id. T 13. Martinez pled guilty to Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
With Intent to Sell under MONTANA CODE ANNOTATE section 45-9-303 (1999) and
received a five-year suspended sentence and deferred fine. Martinez, 7 13. Olson pled
guilty to Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under MONTANA CODE ANNOTATE
section 45-9-302 (1999) and received a four-year suspended sentence and deferred fine.
Martinez, 13.
187. Martinez, IT% 12-13.
188. Id. 7 40.
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Billings.18 9 Clearly, both parties felt that Pratt would be a
crucial factor in deciding Martinez. This would not be surprising
since Pratt involved similar circumstances regarding informant
information providing a basis for particularized suspicion to
support a police stop and subsequent narcotics seizures. 190 But
the Montana Supreme Court appeared to have been unsatisfied
with Pratt providing a foundation for the particularized
suspicion issues presented by the case. Before considering the
case further, the court ordered the parties to provide
supplemental briefs assuming "arguendo, that Pratt and its
progeny [were] not appropriate authority for the vehicle stop on
the facts presented and .. .whether the stop [was] or [was] not
supportable based on other legal authority and argument."' 91
2. Pratt Factors for Particularized Suspicion in Narcotics
Investigations.
After the parties responded with supplemental briefs as
ordered, the court proceeded with its majority opinion, authored
by Justice Jim Nelson. Although the court had expressed
apparent reservations as to the controlling authority of Pratt, a
considerable portion of the Martinez opinion was devoted to
Pratt.92  In fact, the court recalled the Pratt factors with
specificity, 193 but then stated that the Pratt test was "a narrowly
drawn variant of the Gopher analysis [addressing] the reliability
of a citizen's tip in the context of a DUI investigative stop.' ' 94
The court acknowledged that it had indeed applied the Pratt test
in the narcotics possession case of State v. Elison,195 but then
attempted to contrast Pratt as applying only to circumstances
where the investigative stop yields information that will quickly
189. See Appellant's Consolidated Br. at 13-14, 18, Martinez, (Nos. 00-781 & 00-
802); Br. of Resp't at 5, 10-15, 18-19, Martinez, (Nos. 00-781 & 00-802); Appellant's Reply
Br. at 4, State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, 314 Mont. 434, 67 P.3d 207, (Nos. 00-781 & 00-
802).
190. See Pratt, 286 Mont. 156, 951 P.2d 37.
191. Martinez, 9 14.
192. Id. IT9 23, 30-33, 37-38.
193. Id. 9 32. "1) Whether the citizen informant identifies himself to law
enforcement and thus exposes himself to criminal and civil liability if the report is false.
2) Whether the report is based on the personal observations of the informant. 3)
Whether the officer's own observations corroborated the informant's information." Id.
194. Id. 37.
195. Elison, 11 16-23. The court applied the Pratt tests to an officer's stop of the
defendant's vehicle based on the tip of a citizen informant and concluded that the
officer's stop satisfied particularized suspicion standards. Id. 91 23.
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affirm or refute the informant information forming the basis for
the stop. 196  The court then turned from any further
consideration as to the applicability of Pratt and cited the
holding of State v. Anderson: "An uncorroborated tip does not
constitute objective data from which a trained officer can infer a
particular individual is or has been engaged in wrongdoing."'197
3. No Basis for Detention Based on Temporary Registration.
The court acknowledged that the inability of an officer to
see a temporary motor vehicle registration sticker provided
sufficient particularized suspicion to stop a motorist. 198 The
court further agreed that the officers involved testified that the
temporary registration was not fully visible to verify a proper
registration as the vehicle passed by them, which would justify
the stop of the vehicle. 99 But the court refused to hold that the
officers were justified in detaining Martinez and Olson any
longer than was necessary to determine the temporary
registration was valid.200  On this point the court stated:
"Although the officer's inability to read the temporary sticker
justified a stop to check the sticker's validity, once that limited
purpose of the stop had been accomplished, no further police
intrusion was warranted, and the investigative stop related to
drug possession was not justified thereby. '201
4. Anderson Dicta and the Reesman Surprise.
The court's reliance on Anderson did not stop with it's
holding in that case. Although recognizing it as dicta, the court
stated: "A tip that has not been shown to be reliable or
trustworthy for purposes of establishing probable cause to
procure a search warrant is also unreliable for purposes of
providing an officer with a particularized suspicion. '20 2
Although the State had argued that Alabama v. White
should govern the consideration of particularized suspicion in
Martinez, the Montana court rejected this argument and once
196. Martinez, 97 37-39.
197. Id. 42 (citing Anderson, 258 Mont. at 516, 853 P.2d at 1249).
198. Id. 28 (citing State v. Henderson, 1998 MT 233, 1 16, 291 Mont. 77, 16, 966
P.2d 137, 11 16).
199. Id.
200. Id. 29.
201. Id.
202. Martinez, 48 (citing Anderson, 258 Mont. at 516, 853 P.2d at 1249).
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again refused to "march lock-step with pronouncements of the
United States Supreme Court. '203 Citing the express privacy
provisions of the Montana Constitution 20 4 the court stated:
The heightened protection of individual privacy in Montana
demands our divergence from federal jurisprudence regarding the
use of tips as the basis for particularized suspicion justifying the
temporary seizure of a person for questioning. We hold that an
allegation of criminality from an unreliable informant that has no
known basis in fact does not constitute objective data from which
an officer may legitimately infer particularized suspicion . . . if an
unreliable tip provides the only grounds for the detention, the stop
constitutes an unconstitutional infringement of an individual's
right to privacy. 20 5
Having rejected the particularized suspicion standards of
Pratt and White, and linking the legal requirements of probable
cause and particularized suspicion to the same standard by
citing the Anderson dicta, the majority then turned to State v.
Reesman206  to incorporate tests for informant-based
particularized suspicion that had previously been applied only
to the issue of informant-based probable cause for a search
warrant. 20 7 More specifically, the court stated:
As we discussed at length in Reesman . . . [a] tip cannot be
considered reliable without independent corroboration of the
criminality alleged. In the context of particularized suspicion,
because the quantum of suspicion is less, an unreliable tip
requires corroboration that supports an inference that criminality
is afoot by direct police observation of suspicious activity and
consideration of the modes of patterns of operation of certain kinds
of lawbreakers. 20 8
203. Id. 51. It should be noted that Alabama v. White was cited
contemporaneously with State v. Pratt when the Montana court applied the Pratt factors
to narcotics-related particularized suspicion standards in State v. Elison. Elison, 16.
204. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 provides: "The right of individual privacy is essential
to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest."
205. Martinez, 52.
206. 2000 MT 243, 301 Mont. 408, 10 P.3d 83.
207. Id. 7Ji 50, 55. In State v. Reesman, the Montana Supreme Court analyzed
probable cause standards for search warrants based on police informants. The court
distinguished three types of informants: (1) concerned citizens; (2) confidential
informants, and; (3) anonymous tipsters. The court then established independent police
corroboration criteria necessary to support probable cause for search warrants
dependent on the status of the informant. Reesman, Jl 28-35. For a critical analysis of
Reesman, see James D. Johnson, Note, Totality of the Circumstances or a Recipe for
Mulligan Stew?, 65 MONT. L. REV. 159 (2004).
208. Martinez, 1 50 (citations omitted).
2005
27
Capp: A Journey Across the Shifting Sands of Particularized Suspicion in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2005
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
In applying the Reesman standards to the issue of
particularized suspicion in Martinez, the court reasoned that the
Reesman tests could not be satisfied because the confidential
informant had no established track record to support a finding of
reliability and had not enunciated a basis in personal knowledge
of the criminal behaviors she reported to police. 20 9 Furthermore,
as to the confidential informant, although identified to police
and expressing a desire to "do what she thought was right," the
majority concluded that a status of "concerned citizen" was not
warranted. 210  The majority reasoned that the confidential
informant's apparent past history of trouble with the law, her
confidential identity status, and unclear motivations prevented
any status as a "concerned citizen. ''211 The court concluded that
the district court had erred in finding the confidential
informant's tips to be reliable, thereby vitiating any independent
particularized suspicion basis for police to stop Martinez and
Olson on November 4, 1999.212
5. Independent Police Corroboration.
The court next turned to another factor of a Reesman
probable cause analysis and applied it to consideration of the
particularized suspicion issue in the case: Whether the police
investigation had sufficiently corroborated the confidential
informant's information to justify the November 4, 1999 stop of
Martinez and Olson. 213 In analyzing this Reesman factor, the
court considered the information corroborated by police up to the
time of the traffic stop to be "otherwise innocent information"
that would require "indicia of suspicion ... reveal[ing] a pattern
of human behavior associated with the alleged criminal activity,
or activities, which, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with
the alleged criminal activity. "214
The court concluded that police had merely corroborated
innocent information in their investigation that revealed no
209. Id. 56-57.
210. Id. 64.
211. Id.
212. Id. 57.
213. Id. 58.
214. Martinez, 1 58 (citing State v. Griggs, 2001 MT 211, 306 Mont. 366, 34 P.3d
101). The Griggs standards were applied to determine whether probable cause for a
search warrant had been sufficiently established through police corroboration of
otherwise innocent behavior by the defendant, not whether particularized suspicion had
been established. Griggs, 44 50-53.
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"pattern of criminal behavior."215 In reaching this conclusion,
the court discounted any significance in the earlier stop of
Martinez's vehicle and the small amount of marijuana police
had discovered and seized. 216  The court also found it
insignificant that the confidential informant had led police to
the location of the stolen vehicle from Great Falls and reasoned
that no association between the stolen vehicle and the
defendants had ever been established by independent
investigation. 21 7
Using this reasoning, the court concluded that the
November 4, 1999 stop of Martinez and Olson was not legal
beyond the limited purpose of inspecting the temporary
registration. 218 The court held that once this limited purpose
had been accomplished, the police had no further justification to
support an investigative detention and the district court had
erred in failing to suppress all evidence gathered as a result
stop. 219 The decision in Martinez was handed down without any
disturbance to prior case precedents.
C. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Jim Rice and Justice Patricia 0. Cotter wrote
separate dissenting opinions in Martinez.220  Justice Rice
asserted that the Pratt factors for informant reliability
standards to support particularized suspicion were appropriate
to the case. 221 Justice Rice's disagreement with the majority
was based on his belief that: (1) the confidential informant in
the case should have been deemed reliable, and; (2) police
corroboration of the information was sufficient to support
particularized suspicion.222
As to the informant's reliability, Justice Rice would have
given greater weight to the confidential informant as a person
who was motivated by "good citizenship" since she had disclosed
her identity to police and indicated her motivations to "do what
she thought was right. '223 Furthermore, Justice Rice felt the
215. Martinez, 4 60-61.
216. Id. 62.
217. Id.
218. Id. 74.
219. Id.
220. Id. 4 75-95 (Rice, J., dissenting); Id. 44 96-97 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
221. Martinez, 76 (Rice, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Rice, J., dissenting).
223. Id. 79 (Rice, J., dissenting).
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investigators had established the informant's reliability by
verifying the information she had provided during the weeks
prior to the November 4, 1999 stop. 224
Justice Rice wrote that the corroboration of the information
regarding the stolen vehicle and its location in Billings was
sufficient to verify the reliability of the informant and amounted
to much more than corroboration of "perfectly innocent"
information. 225 Indeed, Justice Rice stated, "[b]y the time the
informant informed police about the defendants' trip to
transport drugs to Bozeman, the informant was far beyond a
'first experience,' and should have been considered reliable [by
the majority]. '226 According to Justice Rice, the circumstances of
the case make it clear "that the informant was not fabricating
her reports from 'whole cloth,' but rather, that she was in
strategic proximity to the planning of criminal activity.1227
Justice Rice also took issue with the majority in discounting
the fact that police had discovered a small amount of marijuana
during their earlier traffic stop of Martinez. 228 Although the
officers did not arrest Martinez for the small amount of
marijuana discovered in his vehicle, Justice Rice believed a
totality of circumstances analysis that included this factor would
give rise to sufficient particularized suspicion to warrant the
November 4, 1999 stop. 229
Interestingly, Justice Rice's closing remarks seemed to echo
a similar warning as was penned by Chief Justice Karla Gray in
Kleinsasser.230  Justice Rice concluded his dissent with the
assertion that "[t]he Court has abandoned the totality of
circumstances test for a narrow and rigid application of
standards which bears no resemblance to practical reality ....
[This decision will eventually penalize all citizens by
diminishing the officers' ability to protect their public safety. '231
Justice Cotter's dissent was more succinct. She agreed that
the informant reliability standards of Pratt should be applied to
informant-based particularized suspicion questions, but
224. Id. 82 (Rice, J., dissenting).
225. Id. 11 82-83 (Rice, J., dissenting).
226. Id. 1 82 (Rice, J., dissenting).
227. Martinez, 86 (Rice, J., dissenting).
228. Id. 11 89-92 (Rice, J. dissenting).
229. Id. 11 90-92 (Rice, J., dissenting).
230. State v. Kleinsasser, 2002 MT 36, 32, 308 Mont. 325 1 32, 42 P.3d 801, 32
(Gray, C.J., dissenting).
231. Martinez, 1 94 (Rice, J., dissenting).
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disagreed that these standards had not been met in Martinez.232
She believed that the confidential informant's reliability was
easily established by application of Pratt tests to the
circumstances of the case.233 She noted that the informant's
willingness to identify herself to investigators placed her at risk
for liability associated with false reporting, thus lending
reliability to her informant status and giving the officers
sufficient particularized suspicion for the November 4, 1999 stop
under Pratt.234
TV. ANALYSIS
This analysis will proceed with the assertion that Martinez
was wrongly decided by the Montana Supreme Court when it
applied the Reesman tests for probable cause to the issue of
particularized suspicion presented by the case. In illustrating
this error, the analysis will include discussion of State v.
Olson,235 decided only four days before Martinez on similar facts,
but with an opposite conclusion.
Furthermore, the court's use of probable cause standards in
reviewing whether the police had adequately corroborated the
informant's information was not the appropriate standard if
Gopher and its progeny have not been overturned. Even
assuming the Reesman probable cause tests were appropriately
applied to Martinez, the court should have determined that the
confidential informant's tip to police was adequately verified by
police investigation so as to justify the November 4, 1999 traffic
stop.
Additionally, under Montana particularized suspicion
jurisprudence, the investigative stop and subsequent
questioning of Martinez and Olson should have been upheld
absent a showing that the time of the investigative detention
exceeded the purpose of the stop.236 Since the court's holding in
Farabee remains undisturbed, it is inconsistent for the Martinez
stop to be treated any differently.
232. Id. 96 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Cotter, J., dissenting).
234. Id. (Cotter, J., dissenting).
235. 2003 MT 61, 314 Mont. 402, 66 P.3d 297. Note that the defendant in State v.
Olson was unrelated to the defendant in State v. Martinez.
236. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-403 (1999) (stating that a "stop authorized by §
46-5-401 or § 46-6-411 may not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop.").
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Finally, the court's decision in Martinez illustrates the
beginning of a disturbing precedent of unique judicial creation in
Montana-a double standard for particularized suspicion
dependent on the type of crime suspected. A duality of
particularized suspicion based on the crime suspected is not
contemplated by Montana's particularized suspicion statute or
jurisprudence and should not be a basis for the court's decision
in Martinez.
A. Probable Cause vs. Particularized Suspicion
1. Martinez and Olson: Similar Facts-Different Results.
The Montana Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that
particularized suspicion is a less stringent standard than
probable cause. ' 23 7 Only four days before the Martinez decision,
the court repeated this holding in State v. Olson.238 A close
analysis of Olson reveals that the facts of the case and the issues
presented were very similar to those in Martinez, but the
opposite decisions in the cases, as well as previous precedents of
the court as previously discussed, lends credence to the assertion
that Martinez was wrongly decided.
Like Martinez, the circumstances of Olson began when
police received information from an informant regarding a
potential methamphetamine laboratory. 239  The informant
identified himself to police as the ex-husband of the owner of the
property where the illegal narcotics laboratory was located.240
The informant stated he had been at the garage on the property
to retrieve personal items and had seen "tubing, mason jars, and
coffee filters connected together, and had smelled the odor of
anhydrous ammonia. '241 The informant also advised that he
had encountered a man at the property who had asked whether
he was "going to keep [his observations] cool. '242
Like Martinez, police officers in Olson initiated a
surveillance of the property and soon thereafter observed
237. Olson, 11 36 (citing State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, 14, 306 Mont. 215, T 14,
32 p.3d 735, 14, and State v. Williamson, 1998 MT 199, 12, 290 Mont. 321, 12, 965
P.2d 231, 1 12).
238. Id.
239. Id. 6.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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individuals removing garbage bags from the garage and placing
them into a vehicle, which then left the property.243 And like the
officers in Martinez, police in Olson stopped the vehicle and
found it to be driven by the defendant. 244 Unlike Martinez, no
independent justification to stop the vehicle was asserted as a
basis for the stop of Olson's vehicle.
After stopping Olson and her companions, police removed
Olson from the vehicle and questioned her about materials from
a methamphetamine lab they believed were located in the
trunk. 245 Like the defendants in Martinez, the occupants of the
vehicle were placed in handcuffs during police questioning.246
However, unlike the officers in Martinez, the officers who
stopped and interrogated Olson did not advise her of her Fifth
Amendment rights prior to asking her questions.247 As in
Martinez, police initially received only denials to allegation of
criminal wrongdoing by the Olson defendants. 248 And like
Martinez, Olson eventually admitted that contraband was
present in the vehicle.249 Just as police had done in Martinez, a
search warrant was then obtained for the vehicle and evidence
related to illegal narcotics possession was seized.250 Olson was
arrested and charged with several felonies.251
Like the defendants in Martinez, Olson filed a motion to
suppress evidence seized under the search warrant, arguing that
the seizure was not based on sufficient probable cause, was
based on information from an unreliable informant, and no
particularized suspicion existed to justify the officers' initial
traffic stop. 252 The district court denied Olson's motions to
suppress evidence seized from her vehicle and she ultimately
pled guilty, reserving her right to appeal to the Montana
Supreme Court.253
In affirming Olson's conviction, the Montana court
considered issues very similar to those presented in Martinez.
243. Olson, T 7, 28.
244. Id. 7.
245. Id. T 8.
246. Id. 16.
247. Id. 18.
248. Id. 8.
249. Olson, il 8.
250. Id.
251. Id. 9. Olson ultimately pled guilty to criminal possession of dangerous drugs
in violation of Montana Code Annotated section 45-9-102 (1999). Olson, 10.
252. Olson, 1 9.
253. Id. 10.
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Having concluded that the interrogation of Olson was conducted
in violation of Olson's constitutional rights and should have
been suppressed by the district court, the court excised from the
search warrant the admissions made by Olson in order to
determine whether sufficient probable cause remained. 254
Without Olson's admissions, the primary basis for probable
cause for the search warrant was reduced to the informant's
information and police surveillance of the property.255
To assess the informant's information to police as a basis for
probable cause, the Olson court turned to the Reesman tests for
informant reliability. 25 6 The court concluded that the first factor
of Reesman was satisfied when the informant identified himself
to the investigators. 257 The court reasoned that the second
prong of Reesman was satisfied by the fact that he had
personally seen the suspect materials in his ex-wife's garage
prior to reporting the circumstances to police. 258 As to the
reliability of the Olson informant, the court concluded that he
had the status of a "concerned citizen motivated by good
citizenship" so as to afford him presumed reliability. 259 The
court discounted the fact that the informant and his ex-wife had
a strained relationship that might have created a mixed
motivation for his report to the police. 260 The court also found
that the police observations of removal of garbage bags from the
garage to the vehicle was sufficient corroboration to bolster the
informant's reliability to establish probable cause for the search
warrant.261 Therefore, the court concluded the circumstances in
Olson provided police with probable cause to stop the Olson
vehicle based solely on the informants statements and the police
observations of garbage bags being removed from the
property. 262
Having concluded that probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant existed under the Reesman tests, the issue of
particularized suspicion was axiomatic, but nonetheless
254. Id. 21.
255. Id. IT 25, 28.
256. Id. 7T7 25-28.
257. Id. 25.
258. Olson, 26.
259. Id. 27.
260. Id.
261. Id. 77 28-29.
262. Id. 29.
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addressed by the court.263 Like Martinez, the court began by
citing Montana's investigative stop statute and the standard of
particularized suspicion enunciated by the statute.264 However,
unlike Martinez, the court did not look to Reesman to determine
whether particularized suspicion thresholds had been met by
the officers who stopped Olson's vehicle. Furthermore, although
the basis for the investigative stop was at least partially based
on information from an informant, the court ignored Pratt, too.
Instead, the court turned to the particularized suspicion tests
adopted under Gopher265 and codified by statute. 266
The court agreed that the conduct observed by the officers
conducting the surveillance of the Olson defendants was
arguably innocent in nature (loading garbage bags from the
garage into the vehicle). 267 But the court further reasoned that
the same behavior took on new meaning when viewed in light of
information from the informant, which would give rise to a
particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing under a totality
of the circumstances. 268
2. Martinez Under a Particularized Suspicion Analysis.
The rationale applied by the Montana Supreme Court in
Olson clearly delineates a difference between standards of
probable cause and standards of particularized suspicion. As
the Olson opinion noted, "particularized suspicion is a less
stringent standard than probable cause. '269  Had the court
adhered to this distinction in Martinez, it would have analyzed
the November 4, 1999 stop to reach a different conclusion.
First, the court would not have applied Reesman to the issue
of particularized suspicion for the Martinez stop. In Olson, the
Reesman tests were applied solely for the purpose of
determining whether probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrant existed after police had unlawfully obtained
admissions from the defendant. 270  No such redaction was
necessary in Martinez since police immediately informed the
263. Id. 11 30-36.
264. Olson, 31 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-401 (1999)).
265. Id. 1 32 (citing Grindeland v. State, 2001 MT 196, 7i 10, 306 Mont. 262, 71 10,
32 P.3d 767, 10).
266. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (2001).
267. Olson, If 35.
268. Id.
269. Id. 1 36.
270. Id. TV 25-29.
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defendants of their Miranda rights after stopping them.271
Therefore, there was no reason for an application of Reesman to
determine whether particularized suspicion existed in the
Martinez stop.
Instead, as it did in Olson, the court should have applied the
Gopher test to the Martinez stop.272 Applying the Gopher tests,
the Montana court would have concluded that there was
sufficient objective data from which an experienced officer could
make inferences to show that the occupants of the Martinez
vehicle were engaged in wrongdoing. The information from the
informant had been verified through police surveillance;
interviews with other witnesses (motel employees who
corroborated the informant's statements); police contact with the
suspects (finding a small amount of marijuana in the process);
verification of criminal behavior (location and recovery of a
stolen vehicle); and verification of innocent but important details
(travel to Bozeman in a different vehicle after police contact with
the previous vehicle). The Montana court simply cannot affirm
a holding that "particularized suspicion is a less stringent legal
standard than probable cause"273 on one day and then analyze a
particularized suspicion stop by probable cause tests only four
days later!
Second, the court admitted that the Olson surveillance
revealed only innocent behavior by the defendants when they
were observed loading garbage bags into their vehicle. 274 But
the court gave credence to the experience of the officers who saw
the behavior as suspicious when viewed from their perspective
and in light of the information provided by the informant, even
to the point that probable cause was established. 275 Four days
later, the court gave no credence to the professional experience
of officers who had similarly observed otherwise innocent
behavior that they viewed as suspicious in light of information
received from an informant. 276 In Olson, the court gave a
presumption of reliability to an identified informant who had
never provided any previously verified information to the
police. 277 In Martinez, the court deemed information provided by
271. Martinez, 10.
272. Olson, 32.
273. Id. 36
274. Id. 35.
275. Id. 4 29, 35.
276. Martinez, 62.
277. Olson, 27.
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an identified informant to be unreliable even though the
informant's information had led to the location and recovery of a
stolen vehicle and was verified by contacts with other witnesses
and repeated over several weeks. 278 If the Montana Supreme
Court can find standards for probable cause were satisfied prior
to the Olson vehicle stop, then four days later the same court
should have found the Martinez vehicle stop had satisfied the
lesser standard of particularized suspicion.
A final circumstance supporting the inapplicability of
Reesman to the circumstances of Martinez is found in a careful
review of the appellate briefs submitted by the parties.
Reesman wasn't even mentioned, let alone argued, in the
original briefs submitted by the parties. After the court ordered
supplemental briefing with a jaundiced eye toward Pratt,279 the
appellants failed to make any reference to Reesman as a
controlling case for Martinez. The State mentioned Reesman in
its Supplemental Brief in two sentences separated from one
another by three pages of argument; not for any argument
related to probable cause, but rather for the "amorphous nature"
of the totality of the circumstance test 28 0 and the assertion that
"further independent corroboration . . by law enforcement
personnel is the panacea" for information from police
informants. 281
The appellants in their Supplemental Reply Brief cited both
Pratt and Reesman in a single sentence for the proposition that
a state supreme court may provide specific factors for analysis of
informant information. 28 2 But these minor references by the
parties in no way asserted that Reesman was applicable to
assessment of particularized suspicion for a police stop. In
plucking Reesman from its proper probable cause roots and
grafting it onto the branches of particularized suspicion
jurisprudence, the Montana court took another step toward
"judicially repeal[ing]" Montana Code Annotated Section 45-6-
401 and "effectively overrul[ing]" Gopher.288
278. Martinez, 64.
279. Id. 14.
280. Supplemental Br. of Resp't at 5-6, State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, 314 Mont.
434, 67 P.3d 207 (Nos. 00-781 & 00-802).
281. Id.
282. Appellant's Supplemental Reply Br. at 5, State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, 314
Mont. 434, 67 P.3d 207 (Nos. 00-781 & 00-802).
283. See State v. Kleinsasser, 202 MT 36, T 32, 308 Mont. 325, If 32, 42 P.3d 801,
32. (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
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B. Independent Grounds for the Martinez Stop.
In deciding Martinez, the Montana Supreme Court
discounted any basis in the stop of the Martinez vehicle
associated with the fact the vehicle displayed a temporary
registration sticker that was not immediately visible to the
officers. 28 4  But the court seems to have forgotten the
circumstances of a pretext investigative stop it favorably
affirmed in Farabee.28 5
In Farabee officers used the pretext of a broken headlamp to
stop the defendant when they really wanted to question him
about narcotics trafficking, and the Montana court deemed this
appropriate and well within the boundaries of particularized
suspicion law. 28 6 There the court stated, "[w]e have never held.
. . that an otherwise objectively justifiable traffic stop is
nonetheless unlawful because a law enforcement officer used the
stop to investigate a hunch about other criminal activity. '28 7
The court took no exception to the fact that the headlamp
violation occurred in broad daylight or that a subsequent
interrogation of Farabee by the narcotics officers ensued and
resulted in his arrest and conviction on narcotics charges.
But in Martinez the court took exception to a similar
circumstance and held that the officers should have released
Martinez and Olson without questioning as soon as the
registration violation was handled.288 It now seems that the
court has taken a different view, but Farabee remains good law.
If the court had properly applied its holding in Farabee to the
circumstances of Martinez, the necessary particularized
suspicion for the stop of Martinez's vehicle would have been
supported and evidence subsequently obtained would not have
been suppressed.
C. A Double Standard for Particularized Suspicion.
In deciding Martinez in the manner that it did, the Montana
Supreme Court seems to have wanted to preserve particularized
suspicion standards in one type of case, but create higher
standards in other types of cases. More specifically, the court's
284. Martinez, 29.
285. State v. Farabee, 2000 MT 265, 30-32, 302 Mont. 29, 30-32, 22 P.3d 175,
1 T 30-32.
286. Id. 29.
287. Id.
288. Martinez, 29.
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decision in Martinez arguably created a double standard for
particularized suspicion based on the type of crime suspected
when police make an investigative stop. The court contrasted
the Pratt line of cases from those like Martinez when it stated:
An investigative stop is a particularly effective tool for DUI
investigations and to prevent highway tragedies. A brief face-to-
face exchange between the driver and a trained officer often will
affirm or refute an informant's allegation of drunkenness .... In
most cases, within minutes and with minimal intrusion, a trained
officer will be able to discern whether probable cause exists for a
DUI arrest or whether inferences drawn from [an informant's tip]
were incorrect. 28 9
But the court then distinguished the investigative stop for
other crimes, such as those associated with narcotics by stating:
By contrast, a vehicular stop in a drug interdiction case is less
likely to yield decisive evidence of either innocence or criminality.
... The brief detainment and questioning permitted during an
investigative stop might not materially advance an investigation
for drug possession if no incriminating evidence is visible and no
one consents to a search or confesses. 290
The court's speculation on the investigative stop dependent
on whether the suspected crime is a DUI offense or a drug
offense is entirely dicta, but it does seem to provide an insight
into where the majority was coming from as it went on to apply
a probable cause standard to what should have been a simple
particularized suspicion review. By using these distinctions, the
court was able to avoid the use of Pratt and gravitate toward
Reesman probable cause standards when the sole issue was one
of particularized suspicion. It seems that this may actually have
been the rationale behind the court's reticence to apply Pratt to
the facts of Martinez, which most certainly would have resulted
in a different holding under Pratt 's particularized suspicion
standards. If so, the use of a double standard for particularized
suspicion within the reasoning of the court is wholly
inappropriate. Montana law has specified one statutory
standard for particularized suspicion regardless of the type of
crime involved. 291  Moreover, this statutory hallmark was
modeled after the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Gopher,
even using some of the court's own decisive language in creating
the statutory particularized suspicion standard.292 Given the
289. Id. If 38.
290. Id. 39.
291. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (2003).
292. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (1999) and discussion of statutory language
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fact that the court has no qualms about snatching dicta from one
case and making it law in another,293 it will come as no surprise
if the court gives this double-standard for particularized
suspicion the force of law in a future case.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of particularized suspicion in Montana has seen
many changes between Gopher and Martinez. From its federal
roots in Terry and Cortez to its adaptations in the Montana
Supreme Court, particularized suspicion has been an effective
tool of law enforcement as it protects the public from the
criminal element. The Montana court's recent decisions in the
area of particularized suspicion seem to signal significant
changes and a return to probable cause standards when certain
crimes are implicated, or when police informants are the basis
for investigative stops.
Certainly it is the responsibility of law enforcement to see
that the lesser standard of particularized suspicion to support
investigative detention is not squandered by haphazard
applications and creative report writing. And nearly all the
time, law enforcement officers uphold their responsibilities to
the United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution
with vigor, respect, and honor.
But law enforcement cannot operate effectively in protecting
the public when the legal ground on which they stand is shifting
under the philosophical whims of the Montana Supreme Court.
The standards for particularized suspicion were succinctly
stated in Gopher and appropriately applied to informant-based
information under Pratt. The Montana court's decision in
Martinez reaches too far and paints the court and law
enforcement into a proverbial corner; particularized suspicion is
still the law, but probable cause seems to be the standard for
investigative stops when informants provide narcotics-related
information to police. When it pleases, the Montana court takes
liberty with particularized suspicion standards and employs a
higher standard of probable cause, as it did in Kleinsasser and
now Martinez. The court should return itself to the
particularized suspicion standards enunciated in Gopher and
origins in supra text accompanying note 73.
293. Martinez, 48 (quoting dicta from State v. Anderson, 258 Mont. at 516, 853
P.2d at 1249, to provide reasoning for application of Reesman to particularized
suspicion.).
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GOPHER TO MARTINEZ
codified by the Montana Legislature.294 To do less does not serve
the public or the men and women of law enforcement who are
charged with the public's protection.
294. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (2003).
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